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ekr@rtfm.com

rlb@ipv.sx

dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com

tpauly.ietf@gmail.com

This document requires the network at the IETF plenary meeting to protect the security and privacy of its users. About This Document The latest revision of this draft can be found at . Status information for this document may be found at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction IETF meeting participants depend heavily on Internet access during the IETF plenary meeting. The venue selection process defined in makes a functional network a mandatory criterion:

A critical, but implicit requirement in this paragraph is that IETF participants need to be secure in their use of the Internet. It will clearly have a material impact on participants' Internet use if they cannot use the security technologies they require, or if accessing the IETF network requires them to reduce their security or privacy posture (e.g., by revealing sensitive information). As expressed in , the IETF considers pervasive monitoring an attack, The IETF has a long history of developing protocols to protect the confidentiality and authenticity of Internet communications, such as IPsec, DNSSEC, TLS, and SSH. More recently, there has been a focus on protecting the identities of the endpoints to communication, e.g., MASQUE, OHAI, and ECH. The security properties of the IETF network should be aligned with these principles. For example:

• IETF attendees often employ mechanisms such as IPsec, HTTPS, Oblivious HTTP, and TLS ECH to protect the security and privacy of their business and day-to-day Internet usage. If these security features cannot be used, attendees will not be able to use the Internet as they need to.
• IETF attendees typically expect that the IETF network will not collect more information about their usage of it than is technically necessary to operate the network. If IETF users need to authenticate in a way that their Internet traffic can be attributed to them by local or upstream network operators, this expectation would be violated, and attendees might not be willing or able to use the Internet under such circumstances.

This document updates the requirements of to make these security requirements explicit.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Requirements This document extends the mandatory criteria as follows:

• The IETF network MUST be compatible with widely-used Internet security technologies, and MUST NOT interfere with their usage. These properties MUST also hold for upstream networks. In other words, in addition to global reachability at the IP layer, the network must provide secure global reachability, in the sense of being able to securely connect to any other endpoint on the Internet using any widely-used security protocol.

This text is intended to ensure that IETF participants can continue to get the level of security that they require when they use the IETF network.

• The IETF network MUST NOT collect information about IETF participants' Internet usage beyond what is technically required to operate the network. If user-linked information needs to be collected, then it MUST NOT be disseminated beyond the immediate IETF network operational team, and MUST be deleted at the end of an IETF meeting. The IETF network MUST be accessible by any IETF participant without providing authentication information that is tied to their identity. If user-specific authentication is required, it MUST be possible for users to anonymously obtain an arbitrary number of credentials which are not linkable to their identity. The network SHOULD provide unauthenticated access or access via a shared credential if practicable.

This text is intended to maximize user privacy and forbid any authentication mechanisms which would make it possible to attribute traffic to a specific identifiable user.

Security Considerations The requirement in this document enhances user security and privacy by reducing a network observer's ability to track user behavior. The requirement may make it more difficult to manage abusive behavior by network users, however, the IETF network currently routinely operates in a mode without any user-level authentication, so this requirement does not create a security regression.

IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions.

References Normative References The IETF Administration Support Activity (IASA) is responsible for arranging the selection and operation of the IETF plenary meeting venue. This memo specifies IETF community requirements for meeting venues, including hotels and meeting space. It also directs the IASA to make available additional process documents that describe the current meeting selection process. In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Informative References Pervasive monitoring is a technical attack that should be mitigated in the design of IETF protocols, where possible.

Acknowledgments TODO acknowledge.